Almost entirely franchised, with large multi-unit operators. RBI has selectively taken restaurants back onto its own balance sheet during operator distress.
Popeyes is the clearest example of why unit count is a lagging indicator. The system is still enormous — 3,578 restaurants across the U.S. and Canada — but U.S. comparable sales have now been negative for six straight quarters, Q1 2026 was the worst quarter in roughly two decades at -6.5%, and average franchisee restaurant-level profit has fallen to about $235,000. At that level of unit economics, a leveraged 100-unit operator does not have a cash-flow problem, it has a solvency problem, which is exactly what played out at Sailormen. RBI's answer is operational rather than promotional: a new U.S. president out of the Burger King turnaround, a narrower menu, permanent value architecture and a materially larger field organization. RBI's CEO expects positive comps in the second half of 2026. For real estate, the more important consequence is inventory — every distressed Popeyes portfolio produces second-generation drive-thru boxes in dense, chicken-proven trade areas.
Cap rate
5.10%–6.80% marketed range; ~5.80% average asking4
Typical Popeyes net-lease deals carry 15–20 year initial terms with 7.5%–10% rent bumps every five years, and pricing has historically run roughly $1.2M–$4.1M. The credit is almost always a franchisee entity, and 2026 has supplied a live stress test: Four Corners Property Trust has bought Popeyes assets with ~20 years of term remaining, while distressed franchisee lease rejections are pushing second-generation Popeyes boxes back into the market.45
| Date | Location | Price | Cap | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08 | Naugatuck, CT4 | $1.75M | — | — |
| 2026 | Not disclosed4 | $4.7M | — | ~20 years remaining |
| 2023 | South Carolina6 | $1.6M | — | — |
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| Date | Type | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Closure | Florida and Georgia (33) — Sailormen rejected leases on roughly 33 locations it could not sell in Chapter 11, forcing permanent closures.5 |
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What it means for the Chicken Wars: The decline moderated from -6.5% in Q1, which management will present as progress. It isn't recovery. Six consecutive negative quarters at ~$235K of restaurant-level profit is a franchisee solvency timeline, not a marketing problem — and the Sailormen bankruptcy already showed what the end of that timeline looks like.
What it means for the Chicken Wars: Read the per-store prices: Popeyes corporate paid $600K per restaurant for 16 Miami units; 61 Biscuits paid $370K per restaurant in West Palm Beach; Pulse paid about $54K per restaurant for 50 units across Tampa, Tallahassee, Pensacola and Jacksonville. That spread is a live map of where Popeyes trade areas still work and where they don't. Thirty-three restaurants found no buyer at all and went dark through lease rejection.
What it means for the Chicken Wars: The $235K figure is the most consequential number RBI disclosed. At that level, a franchisee carrying acquisition debt across 100 units cannot service it. Sailormen filed in January. Assume more filings follow before comps turn.
What it means for the Chicken Wars: 3,300 employees, $233.5M of fiscal 2025 revenue, 136 restaurants across Florida and Georgia — gone as a going concern within twelve months of the franchisor reporting $235K average restaurant profit. The largest single distress event in chicken franchising this cycle.
Every figure on this page is attributed. CSW does not publish estimates as facts — where a number is unavailable it is shown as “—”, and where a figure is derived arithmetically from two published figures it is marked as derived.